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NOTE
Is This Necessary: An Analysis of the
Court’s Relaxed Application of Anderson in
Peters v. Johns
Peters v. Johns, 489 S.W.3d 262 (Mo. 2016) (en banc)

Aaron Hadlow*

I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, policing tactics have undergone increased public scrutiny as Black Lives Matter1 and other social activists have called attention to
incidents where police officers have used lethal force. Reports, such as the
United States Department of Justice’s Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department,2 have revealed deeply systemic policing practices that enforce poverty among minority groups by means of racially-targeted policing practices
and subsequent penalties. Perhaps nowhere in the country are these issues
more pressing upon the minds of voters than in the St. Louis, Missouri, community. These issues are what motivated St. Louisan Rachel Johns to seek the
Missouri House of Representatives’ seat for her North County community.
These issues are what motivated her to engage a political system that she had
long felt “failed her.” Johns, as any who seeks to do the hard work of effecting
positive community change, was met with adversity: Her candidacy was challenged because she failed to meet the formal election requirements of Missouri’s Constitution. The courts agreed with her challenger, and Johns was told
*

B.A., Philosophy, Missouri State University, 2011; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2018. I extend my thanks to my wife and family for their continual support of my academic endeavors. I am also grateful to my faculty advisor
Professor Reuben and the members of the Missouri Law Review for their thoughtful
feedback throughout the editing process.
1. Beginning as “[a] call to action,” the Black Lives Matter movement was
formed as an activist organization that works to “creat[e] a world where black lives
actually do matter” by encouraging social action to combat the violence inflicted on
communities of color by “the state and vigilantes.” Elizabeth Day, #BlackLivesMatter:
The Birth of a New Civil Rights Movement, GUARDIAN (July 19, 2015, 5:00 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/19/blacklivesmatter-birth-civil-rightsmovement; About: Build Power, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).
2. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 42 (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf.
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she must wait – wait to run until 2018, wait to pursue her and her supporters’
political objectives, and wait for the uncertain tides of political momentum to
change, perhaps unfavorably.
This Note analyzes the Supreme Court of Missouri’s application of Anderson v. Celebrezze in one of Missouri’s most recent candidacy requirement
cases, Peters v. Johns.3 It argues that the court underappreciated the burden
imposed on Johns by its two-year voter registration requirement.4 Part II discusses the facts and holding of Peters v. Johns. Part III provides the legal
background to help understand the court’s decision. Part IV discusses the
court’s reasoning in Peters v. Johns, while Part V argues for a more rigorous
application of the Anderson test.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On February 4, 2015, Rachel Johns, a resident of the 76th District of the
Missouri House of Representatives, registered to vote.5 In 2016, Johns declared her candidacy for the Democratic Party’s nominee for the 76th District,
which was to be decided during the August 2, 2016, primary.6 Johns filed the
required paperwork with the Missouri Secretary of State’s Office.7 Johns
stated under oath that she “will qualify” to hold the office of state representative as required by Missouri’s Constitution.8
Joshua Peters, the incumbent, was also running in the Democratic primary
for the 76th District.9 Peters filed suit in the Circuit Court of the City of St.
Louis challenging Johns’s candidacy.10 Peters challenged Johns’s candidacy
pursuant to Missouri Revised Statute section 115.526 because she would not
have been a registered voter for two years prior to the November 8, 2016, general election.11 Peters argued that Johns, therefore, could not meet the twoyear durational voter registration requirement found in article III, section 4 of
the Missouri Constitution.12 Article III, section 4 requires a candidate to be “a
qualified voter for two years” prior to the date of the general election.13 Peters
sought to have Johns removed from the Democratic primary ballot.14
Johns argued that the durational voter registration requirement was constitutionally invalid because its temporary disqualification of her candidacy
3. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Peters v. Johns, 489 S.W.3d
262 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
4. See infra Part V.
5. Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 265–66.
6. Id. at 266 & n.1.
7. Id. at 266.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 266 & n.2.
10. Id. at 266.
11. Id.; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 115.526 (2016).
12. Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 266; see also MO. CONST. art. III, § 4.
13. MO. CONST. art. III, § 4.
14. Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 266.
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was a penalty for engaging in First Amendment protected “expressive
speech.”15 Johns stated that she had not registered to vote because to do so
“would mean endorsing a system that had continued to fail her community.” 16
Further, Johns argued that the durational voter registration requirement unconstitutionally burdened her voting rights and the voting rights of the residents of
her legislative district.17
The Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis held that the durational voter
registration requirement did not constitutionally violate the First or Fourteenth
Amendment.18 The circuit court ruled that Johns be removed from the primary
ballot.19 Johns appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Missouri pursuant to
the court’s exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional questions.20 The Supreme
Court of Missouri held that (1) a “qualified voter” under article III, section 4 is
a registered voter; (2) Johns failed to preserve at trial a Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection claim;21 (3) Johns’s failure to register as a voter did not qualify as “expressive speech” under the First Amendment; and (4) article III, section 4 requirements did not violate the voting rights of Johns or the voters in
her legislative district.22

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The holding in Peters v. Johns requires an understanding of the court’s
application of the First Amendment to the issues of symbolic speech, voting
requirements, candidacy requirements, and associational rights. Part A of this
section overviews the history of Missouri’s voter registration requirements for
candidacy. Part B of this section briefly reviews judicial levels of scrutiny.
Part C of this section outlines a few relevant cases on expressive conduct. Part
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 266, 270.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 266.
Id. The court noted that the basis of its decision relies on the First and Fourteenth Amendments and eschewed a “separate Equal Protection Clause analysis.” Id.
at 272 n.10. But the court recognized its decision “necessarily relies . . . on the analysis
of a number of cases applying the ‘fundamental rights’ strand of equal protection law.”
Id.
19. See id. at 266.
20. Id. at 266 & n.3; see also MO. CONST. art. V, § 3.
21. The court quickly disposed of this claim. In doing so, it discussed the requirements of preservation. Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 269. To preserve a constitutional challenge, Missouri courts have held that a party must: (1) raise the challenge at the earliest
opportunity; (2) state with specificity the constitutional provision at issue; (3) support
the challenge with facts showing a constitutional violation; and (4) preserve the question throughout appellate review. Id.; Mayes v. Saint Luke’s Hosp. of Kan. City, 430
S.W.3d 260, 266 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). The purpose for this rule is to allow the circuit
court an opportunity to “fairly identify and rule on the issue.” Peters, 489 S.W.3d at
269. Given the court’s quick treatment of the claim, and the limited scope of arguments
addressed here, this point is not addressed elsewhere in this Note.
22. Id. at 268–69, 271, 277–78.
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D of this section discusses durational voter registration requirements and the
impact of those requirements on (1) candidacy rights and (2) voter rights.

A. The Meaning of a “Qualified Voter”
Missouri Constitution article III, section 4 lays out the “qualifications of
representatives.”23 Article III, section 4’s durational voter registration provision requires representatives to “be twenty-four years of age, and next before
the day of his election shall have been a qualified voter for two years.”24 The
legislature’s use of the words “qualified voter” dates back to Missouri’s 1875
Constitution.25 Under the 1875 Constitution,26 other candidacy provisions similarly had a durational “qualified voter” requirement.27 “Qualified voter” was
also used to describe those entitled to vote.28
The court first read “qualified voter” to mean “registered voter” in State
ex. rel. Woodson v. Brassfield.29 In that case the court noted that if a law
required registration, then a qualified voter was only one that had fulfilled the
registration requirements.30 Notably, under Missouri’s 1875 Constitution,
only white males twenty-one years of age or older were eligible for registration
and thus, qualification.31 As voting rights expanded beyond the narrow class
eligible32 under the court’s early interpretation of “qualified voter,” the court
continued to reaffirm that “qualified voter” meant “registered voter.”33

23.
24.
25.
26.

See MO. CONST. art. III, § 4.
Id. (emphasis added).
MO. CONST. of 1875, art. IV, § 4 (1909).
Missouri’s 1875 Constitution became ineffective upon the ratification of the
state’s 1945 Constitution. Missouri’s case law describing the development of the definition of “qualified voter” still relies, in part, on the 1875 provision. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Burke v. Campbell, 542 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
27. See, e.g., MO. CONST. of 1875, art. IV, § 6 (1909) (state senators); see also id.
art. VI, § 26 (circuit judges).
28. See MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 2 (1909); id. art. IV, § 2; id. art. IV, § 5;
id. art. VI, § 5; id. art. VI, § 25.
29. State ex rel. Woodson v. Brassfield, 67 Mo. 331 (1878).
30. Id. at 336.
31. See MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 2 (1909).
32. Id. (“Every male citizen of the United States . . . who is over the age of twentyone years . . . .”).
33. See, e.g., State ex rel. Burke v. Campbell, 542 S.W.2d 355, 357–58 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1976); State ex rel. Mason v. Cty. Legislature, 75 S.W.3d 884, 887–88 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2002).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss1/10

4

Hadlow: Is This Necessary

2018]

IS THIS NECESSARY

175

B. Levels of Scrutiny
There are generally three levels of scrutiny applied by a court when it
reviews a state law or regulation that restricts constitutionally protected activity.34 Those three levels of scrutiny are (1) rational basis, (2) intermediate,
interchangeably called “heightened,” and (3) strict scrutiny. The level of scrutiny applied is determined by the constitutional right at issue. If a court regards
a right as more important or fundamental, then the court examines the purpose
of the state restriction more closely. Review under the rational basis test is the
most deferential to state interests underlying a statute or regulation of constitutionally protected activity. A state restriction will be upheld under rational
basis review if it is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”35 Formulations of the test applied for intermediate scrutiny vary, though generally
courts balance the imposition of the restriction on the right at issue against the
State’s “important or substantial” interest underlying the restriction.36 Finally,
strict scrutiny requires the state restriction on constitutional rights be “narrowly
tailored” to achieve a “compelling state interest.”37
Under these tiers of review, the court often upholds state restrictions of
individual rights when reviewed under rational basis. Similarly, outcomes under intermediate scrutiny review often favor state restrictions.38 Unlike rational
basis and intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny often results in courts striking
down state restrictions on individual rights.39

C. Symbolic Speech and Expressive Conduct
The First Amendment protects “expressive conduct” as a species of “symbolic speech.”40 But, a party asserting a free-speech claim must first “demonstrate that the First Amendment even applies.”41 This burden of first demonstration may be met by showing that the conduct in question was expressive.42

34. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 784 (2007).
35. Id. at 786.
36. Id. at 791 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
37. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800–01 & n.30 (2006).
38. Bhagwat, supra note 34, at 818. For example, in First Amendment cases “the
lower courts’ analysis of cases in different areas of intermediate scrutiny is very consistent – regardless of context, the government usually wins.” Id.
39. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (coining
the phrase that strict scrutiny is “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact”).
40. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984);
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 375; Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989).
41. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 n.5.
42. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
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Expressive conduct may trigger First Amendment protections when it is “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication.”43
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence, the U.S. Supreme
Court did not disturb a lower court’s finding of expressive conduct when demonstrators sought to sleep on the National Mall in Washington, D.C., in structures constructed to symbolize the plight of the homeless.44 The Court upheld
a National Park Service regulation, which prohibited overnight camping at the
National Mall, on the basis of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.45
In addressing the preliminarily issue whether conduct was expressive, and
thereby warranting application of the First Amendment, the Court noted that
“it is the obligation of the person desiring to engage in assertedly expressive
conduct to demonstrate that the First Amendment even applies.”46 This ruling
did not “deviate from the general rule that one seeking relief bears the burden
of demonstrating that he is entitled to it.”47 Subsequent First Amendment analysis for expressive conduct is predicated on this initial showing.48
The Supreme Court has given instructions on meeting this burden.49 One
way to meet this burden is to show that conduct is “necessarily expressive.”50
In United States v. O’Brien, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of 50
U.S.C. § 462(b), which prohibited the willful or knowing destruction or mutilation of one’s Selective Service Registration Certificate.51 A Selective Service
Registration Certificate is commonly known as a draft card.52 On March 31,
1966, David O’Brien and three fellow protesters burned their draft cards on the
steps of the South Boston Courthouse.53 The crowd that witnessed the event
turned violent and O’Brien was escorted by an FBI agent inside the courthouse,
where O’Brien was placed under arrest.54 O’Brien told the FBI agent that he
burned his draft card in political protest.55 O’Brien also indicated his awareness of 50 U.S.C. § 462(b)’s prohibition on such acts.56
In analyzing O’Brien’s conduct under the First Amendment, the Court
remarked that it could not “accept the view that an apparently limitless variety

43. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409
(1974)).
44. Clark, 468 U.S. at 291–93.
45. Id. at 294–95.
46. Id. at 293 n.5.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 293 (holding that a showing of expressive conduct sufficient to trigger
First Amendment protections “only begins the inquiry”).
49. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375 (1968).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 370.
52. Id. at 386.
53. Id. at 369.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”57 The Court noted that conduct with
a “communicative element” may warrant First Amendment protection, but
when “‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest” may permit the State
to regulate the activity.58
This application of heightened scrutiny59 justifies a regulation if “[the regulation] furthers an important or substantial governmental interest”; if that interest “is unrelated to the suppression of free expression”; and if “the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest.”60
The Court found Congress to have “sweeping” power to raise and support
armies.61 Further, Congress could establish a “system of registration for individuals liable for training and service, and may require such individuals within
reason to cooperate in the registration system.”62 The Court held that any legislation enacted to ensure “the continuing availability” of issued draft cards
served a “legitimate and substantial purpose” because the draft cards served (1)
as initial notice of registration and eligibility classifications, (2) as proof that
the individual described on the card had in fact registered for the draft, (3) to
facilitate communication between registrants and local draft boards, (4) as continual reminders of requirements imposed on the registrant to update information with local boards, and (5) as notice of prohibitions against deceptive
misuse of certificates including alteration or forgery.63 The Court also held
that the regulation was narrowly drafted only to prevent “harm to the smooth
and efficient functioning of the Selective Service System.”64 The Court distinguished the O’Brien restriction from others that specifically restricted “communicative element[s]” of expressive conduct, like a restriction punishing people who expressed their opposition to organized government by displaying a
flag or other symbol.65 The Court held that the O’Brien restriction was narrowly tailored to regulate the “noncommunicative” elements of O’Brien’s conduct and any restriction on the “communicative” elements of O’Brien’s conduct was incidental.66
While deciding O’Brien, the Court limited the scope of First Amendment
protections for symbolic speech if the “incidental restriction” on free speech is

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 376.
Id.
See supra Part III.B.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 377–79.
Id. at 382.
Id.; see also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (striking down
a prohibition on displaying a Communist Party flag).
66. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382.
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“no greater than . . . essential” to further an “important or substantial” governmental interest.67 The Court returned to the issue of symbolic speech in Texas
v. Johnson, where it found a Texas flag-burning statute unconstitutional.68
In Texas v. Johnson, the Court laid out the elements required for expressive conduct to merit symbolic speech status.69 Texas passed a statute70 that
prohibited the “desecration of a venerated object.”71 Gregory Lee Johnson participated in a demonstration that culminated when Johnson “unfurled the
American flag, doused it with kerosene, and set it on fire.”72 Johnson was
charged, convicted, and sentenced to one year in prison and a $2000 fine.73
In determining whether Johnson’s flag burning warranted First Amendment protection as expressive speech, the Court asked whether Johnson acted
(1) with “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message” and (2) whether “the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who
viewed it.”74 The Court noted that the flag was central to Johnson’s conduct
and that flags are “[p]regnant with expressive content.”75 Moreover, the context of Johnson’s conduct was at a political demonstration.76 The Court concluded that Johnson’s conduct was “intentional and overwhelmingly apparent,”
therefore, “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication.”77
The Court applied heightened – but not strict – scrutiny, and found that
the interests of Texas in “preventing breaches of the peace” and “preserving
the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity” were insufficient to justify a restriction on Johnson’s expressive conduct.78 The Court emphatically
held that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it
is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable,” citing thirteen
cases that supported its proposition.79
In review, the Court’s rulings for expressive conduct as symbolic speech
afford First Amendment protections under free-speech claims only when a

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 377.
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
Id. at 404.
TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.09(a)(3) (1989), invalidated by Johnson, 491 U.S. 397

(1989).
71.
72.
73.
74.

Johnson, 491 U.S. at 400.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 404 (alteration in original) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405, 410–11 (1974)). This is the test for expressive speech laid out by the Court in
Spence v. Washington.
75. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405.
76. Id. at 406.
77. Id. (second quote quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 409).
78. Id. at 407.
79. Id. at 414.
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claimant meets its burden of first demonstration.80 This burden of first demonstration is met when a plausible contention is shown that the symbolic conduct
in question is expressive.81 Symbolic speech satisfies expressiveness when it
is sufficiently communicative, in that (1) it intends to convey a particularized
message and (2) there is a great likelihood that the message will be understood
by those who viewed it.82

D. Candidacy Requirements
State regulation of elections has been the subject of U.S. Supreme Court
review since as early as 1886.83 Importantly, the Court has discussed the impact of state requirements for candidate filings and voting procedures.84
In Anderson v. Celebrezze, an independent presidential candidate was
barred from the general election ballot in Ohio after not meeting an early filing
requirement for candidacy.85 Ohio required a filed statement of candidacy by
a certain date.86 The candidate failed to file the statement of candidacy by the
deadline but met all other requirements.87
The Court noted the inseparability of candidates’ access to the ballot with
the rights of voters.88 The Court recognized the necessity of regulating elections by reasoning that regulations ensure that the “democratic processes” are
“fair and honest” and involve “some sort of order, rather than chaos.”89 This
paramount state interest warranted a delicate balancing of “the character and
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First . . . Amendment[] that the [candidate] seeks to vindicate” against the identified and evaluated “precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden
imposed by its rule.”90 The balancing test further required the Court to “not
only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests” but also
80.
81.
82.
83.

See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5 (1984).
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375 (1968).
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404.
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 371 (1886) (noting “[i]t has accordingly been held generally in the states that whether the particular provisions of an act
of legislation establishing means for ascertaining the qualifications of those entitled to
vote, and making previous registration in lists of such, a condition precedent to the
exercise of the right, were or were not reasonable regulations, and accordingly valid or
void, was always open to inquiry, as a judicial question”); see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (candidates’ rights); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428
(1992) (voters’ rights).
84. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782 (state requirements for candidate filings); Burdick,
504 U.S. at 430 (voting procedures).
85. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 786.
89. Id. at 788 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
90. Id. at 789.
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to “consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the
[candidate’s] rights.”91
In applying the “character and magnitude of the asserted injury” prong of
its balancing test, the Court determined that ballot access to independent candidates for the presidency was “uniquely important” because the President and
Vice President are the only elected officeholders who represent the nationwide
electorate.92 Because of this unique importance, Ohio’s filing deadline “more
than burden[ed] the associational rights of independent voters and candidates.
It place[d] a significant state-imposed restriction on a nationwide electoral process.”93
The Court then proceeded to the second prong of its balancing test, which
required it to identify and evaluate the “precise interests put forward by the
State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.”94 The second prong
required the Court to not only determine the “legitimacy and strength” of the
State’s interest but also the “extent . . . those interests make it necessary to
burden the [candidate’s] rights.”95 The Court identified three state interests:
voter education, equal treatment, and political stability.96 It ruled that the
State’s voter education interest was “important and legitimate”; however, it did
not justify the restriction to the presidential ballot imposed by the early deadline because “modern communications” allowed for more effective voter education, while campaign spending indicated that most voter education occurred
“largely during the month before an election.”97 The Court similarly found the
State’s interest in equal treatment to be insufficient to justify burdening the
candidate’s rights because independent candidates, unlike partisan candidates,
do not participate in primaries and thereby do not have the same administrative
concerns tied to “intraparty contest[s].”98 It also found the State’s interest in
political stability an insufficient justification for the early deadline for independent candidates.99 The Court held that Ohio’s deadline “for independent
candidates for the office of President of the United States [was not] justified by
the State’s asserted interest.”100
Anderson’s focus was on candidates’ rights.101 In Burdick v. Takushi, the
Court engaged in a similar analysis to that in Anderson but for voters’ rights.102
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id. at 794–95.
Id. at 795.
Id. at 789.
Id.
Id. at 796–806.
Id. at 796–97 (second and third quotes quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 358 (1972))
98. Id. at 799–801.
99. Id. at 801–06.
100. Id. at 805–06.
101. It is important to again note, and the Court recognized, that candidates’ rights
are inextricably bound with voters’ rights. See id. at 786.
102. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438–39 (1992).
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Burdick also illuminated the analysis required by “the extent to which those
interests make it necessary to burden . . . rights” prong of the Anderson balancing test.103 The issue before the Court in Burdick was “whether Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting unreasonably infringe[d] upon its citizens’ rights
under the First . . . Amendment[].”104
The Court rejected the contention that voting regulations are always subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the regulation be narrowly tailored to
advance a compelling state interest, because it “would tie the hands of States
seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.”105 Rather, election efficiency and fairness are better achieved under a more “flexible
standard.”106 That flexible standard, as applied in Burdick, was the Anderson
balancing test.107 The Court fleshed out the Anderson test by distinguishing
the classification of burdens to voter rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.108 If a challenged election regulation imposes a “severe” burden
on voters’ rights, then the regulation must be “narrowly drawn to advance a
state interest of compelling importance.”109 But if an election regulation imposes only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” upon voters’ rights,
then “the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify” the regulation.110 Essentially, the Court ruled that if the burden is “severe,” then strict scrutiny applies.111 But, if the burden imposed is reasonable
and nondiscriminatory, and thereby de minimis, then an important state interest
is sufficient to support the regulation.112 Before the Court proceeded to an
analysis of the merits of Hawaii’s interest, it first engaged in this burden determination.113
In doing so, the Court reiterated that the voters’ rights at issue114 were
inseparable from candidacy rights.115 It then found that Hawaii’s write-in ballot prohibition only limitedly burdened the rights at issue because the prohibition was found to be “reasonable” and it did not require voters to “espouse
positions that they do not support,” but rather it “require[d] them to act in a
timely fashion” in accordance with ballot access regulations to ensure the candidate of their preference is on the ballot “if they wish to express their views

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
Id. at 430.
Id. at 433–34.
Id. at 434.
Id.
See id.
Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).
Id. (quoting Norman, 502 U.S. at 289).
Id.
See id. at 434–39.
The voting rights identified were the right of expression and association with
the candidate of the voter’s choice. Id. at 430.
115. See id. at 434–35.
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in the voting booth.”116 This finding of a limited burden triggered lesser scrutiny.117
The Court then identified Hawaii’s precise interests, which justified the
burden imposed by the State’s prohibition on write-in candidates. Those interests were (1) “avoid[ing] the possibility of unrestrained factionalism at the general election,” and (2) “guard[ing] against ‘party raiding.’”118
Under (1), the Court reasoned that Hawaii was “within its rights to reserve
‘[t]he general election ballot . . . for major struggles . . . [and] not a forum for
continuing intraparty feuds.’”119 A prohibition on write-in candidates “is a legitimate means of averting divisive sore-loser candidacies.”120
Under (2), the Court defined “party raiding” as the “organized switching
of blocs of voters from one party to another in order to manipulate the outcome
of the other party’s primary election.”121 The Court reasoned that Hawaii’s
electoral process could be “circumvented in a party primary election by mounting a write-in campaign for a person who had not filed in time or who had never
intended to run for election.”122 Further, Hawaii’s electoral process could be
“frustrated at the general election by permitting write-in votes for a loser in a
party primary or for an independent who had failed to get sufficient votes to
make the general election ballot.”123 The Court held that the write-in ban was
a “reasonable way of accomplishing” these goals.124

IV. INSTANT DECISION
Part A of this section discusses the majority’s instant decision in Peters
v. Johns authored by Judge Mary R. Russell. Part B of this section discusses
Judge Laura Denvir Stith’s dissenting opinion.

A. Majority Instant Decision
The Supreme Court of Missouri approached the issues in Peters v. Johns
by first deciding the meaning of “qualified voter” as included in article III,
section 4.125 The court held that the meaning of “qualified voter” is to be understood as a registered voter because all jurisdictions require registration to
116. Id. at 438.
117. See id..
118. Id. at 439 (first alteration in original) (first quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers

Party, 479 U.S. 189, 196 (1986), then quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn.,
479 U.S. 208, 219 (1986)).
119. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735
(1974)).
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 n.9 (1983)).
122. Id. at 440.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Peters v. Johns, 489 S.W.3d 262, 266–67 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
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vote.126 This was not always the case in Missouri.127 Under Missouri’s 1875
Constitution, a qualified voter included “all those who could appear at the polls
and vote on election day.”128 Registration was required only for the most populous areas.129 But with the adoption of the 1945 Constitution, Missouri incorporated an understanding that a “qualified voter” was any registered voter
“when and where registration is required.”130 Because Missouri now requires
registration to vote in all of its legislative districts, a “qualified voter” can only
be a registered voter.131 Under this reading, Johns could not be a “qualified
voter” for the required duration in any sense that meets article III, section 4
requirements because she was not registered two years prior to the date of the
general election.132
The court then held that Johns’s failure to register to vote did not invoke
First Amendment protection when she intentionally did not register to avoid
“endorsing a system that had continued to fail her community.”133 The court
held that Johns’s asserted free speech claim did not trigger First Amendment
protections when she could not show that her intentional failure to register was
sufficiently communicative.134 Johns’s failure to register was not sufficiently
communicative because she could not show that it was intended to convey that
she did not endorse a political system that failed her community and that there
was any likelihood her failure to register would have been understood as a political statement.135 The court found Johns “[did] not assert that anyone viewed
[her] voter registration records and observed her absence therefrom,” nor did
she “allege that she told anyone that she intentionally did not register,” as an
act of political protest.136 The court concluded that under these conditions
“there [was] simply no basis” to hold that Johns’s failure to register was “any
different from anyone else’s failure to register simply out of neglect or indifference.”137
The court then held that article III, section 4 did not violate Johns’s candidacy or voting rights by requiring that Johns register a full two years prior to
the date of the general election in which she sought ballot access.138 The court
applied the Anderson balancing test.139 In assessing the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to Johns, the court found that article III, section 4’s
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 268.
Id. at 267.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 268.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 270–71.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 271–72.
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regulation on voter registration invoked (1) Johns’s right to ballot access and
(2) First Amendment associational rights of voters in her district.140
Following Burdick, the court reasoned that it was “the severity of the burden on the asserted constitutional rights that produces the level of scrutiny.”141
The court found that for Johns’s right to ballot access there was only a de minimis burden imposed by article III, section 4 where it (1) affected a non-fundamental right; (2) only delayed her candidacy, not prevented it; and (3) applied
to any “putative candidate for state representative, regardless of economic status or political affiliation.”142 The court then held that given the de minimis
burden, rational basis scrutiny applied.143
Under rational basis scrutiny, the court weighed the identified magnitude
and character of injury to Johns’s right to ballot access against the proffered
interests of Missouri in article III, section 4 requirements.144 The court recognized Missouri’s interest in “protecting the integrity of [its] electoral systems
from frivolous candidacies” to ensure that “election processes are efficient, and
[to] avoid[] voter confusion caused by an overcrowded ballot.”145 Further, the
court recognized that Missouri has an interest in “encouraging candidates to
show a level of commitment to the electoral process and exhibit meaningful
social engagement and interest in Missouri civic affairs.”146 The court reasoned that article III, section 4 requirements were a reasonable means of addressing these interests because they “ensure[] that a prospective legislator has
taken the minimal steps necessary to be entitled to participate in the electoral
process.”147
Turning to the First Amendment associational rights of voters in Johns’s
district, the court held that the burden on voters in Johns’s district was similarly
de minimis when article III, section 4’s nondiscriminatory application did not
impact the right of voters to vote but rather “only temporarily delays their ability to vote for Johns.”148 Under this determination, the court reasoned, rational
basis applied.149 In balancing the injury to voters against Missouri’s interest in
election fairness, and recognizing that “candidates for state representative
demonstrate sufficient seriousness about the electoral systems and social and
civic engagement,” the court held article III, section 4 to be a reasonable
method for achieving Missouri’s interests.150

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 272–73.
Id. at 273 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
Id. at 274–75.
Id.
Id. at 274–77.
Id. at 275.
Id.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 277.
Id.
Id. at 277–78.
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B. Judge Stith’s Dissent
Judge Stith concurred with the majority opinion regarding Johns’s First
Amendment claim that article III, section 4 violated her free speech rights.151
However, Judge Stith dissented from the majority view that article III, section
4 did not violate Johns’s First Amendment rights and the rights of the voters in
the 76th District.152
Judge Stith argued that the court must engage in a full application of the
Anderson test to determine the burden imposed on Johns’s right.153 This determination requires a full consideration of the injury to Johns’s right against
the State’s interests supporting the voter registration requirement.154 Accordingly, Judge Stith reasoned that “[i]f the [State’s] interest is minimal or the
necessity of imposing the burden questionable, then the burden is more likely
to be substantial than where the interest protected is high and its connection to
and the necessity for the burden to protect that interest is great.”155 Only after
engaging in this first burden determination can the court determine the scrutiny
level to be applied.156
Judge Stith argued that the majority failed to engage in this analysis “in
context.”157 Stith’s Anderson analysis “in context” would have the court, instead, consider both the State’s interests alongside Johns’s injury and the necessity of the requirement, then proceed to a scrutiny determination.158 This
stands in contrast to the majority’s approach, which determined the burden in
the “abstract” by only considering the rights at issue, foregoing an evaluation
of the State’s underlying interest and the necessity of the registration requirement.159
Judge Stith further argued that an Anderson analysis “in context” would
have resulted in a substantial burden determination, rather than the majority’s
de minimis determination.160 This difference would have resulted in an application of strict scrutiny, rather than the majority’s application of rational basis

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 278 (Stith, J., dissenting).
Id. Judge Breckenridge and Judge Teitelman joined Judge Stith in dissent. Id.
Id. at 279.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Assumedly, under this approach the emphasis of the Anderson factors
would lie in the interrelation of the injury, the interests, and the necessity of the requirement. On its face, this seems to suggest that the court should consider each factor twice.
Once to make a burden determination and thereby decide which level of scrutiny is
applicable, and then again when considering whether the rights and regulations sufficiently met the Anderson factors in their contextual application to the proper level of
scrutiny. See id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 279–80.
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review.161 Under strict scrutiny, a “restriction [must] be narrowly drawn to
advance a state interest of compelling importance.”162 In Judge Stith’s view,
Missouri’s voter registration requirement was not supported by a sufficiently
compelling state interest; therefore, the restriction should not disqualify
Johns’s candidacy.163

V. COMMENT
This Part argues that (A) the majority opinion underappreciated the “character and magnitude” of the injury to Johns’s First Amendment right, (B) the
court over-appreciated the “legitimacy and strength” of the State’s interests that
support the voter registration requirement, and (C) the court over-appreciated
the necessity of the voter registration requirement.164

A. The Majority Opinion Underappreciates Johns’s Injury
The Anderson balancing test requires the court to first identify “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments that the [candidate] seeks to vindicate.”165 In Peters v. Johns, the court identified two constitutional rights at issue: (1) Johns’s
candidacy rights and (2) voter associational rights under the First Amendment.166 In evaluating Johns’s candidacy rights, the court framed the burden
imposed as de minimis because (1) article III, section 4 placed a “minimal delay” on Johns’s candidacy; (2) the provision was nondiscriminatory; and (3)
the right to run for office was not a fundamental liberty interest.167
The following subparts address Johns’s candidacy rights because any injury that burdens Johns’s candidacy rights necessarily imputes upon the rights

161. Id. at 280.
162. Id. at 279 (alteration in original) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289

(1992)).
163. See id. at 282.
164. While equally worthy of consideration, this note does not fully examine the
injury to the voters’ First Amendment associational rights because of Johns’s removal
from the ballot. Nor does it consider the court’s refusal to reach the First Amendment
issue of Johns’s failure to register to vote as symbolic speech. While not at issue in this
case, there is a problematic failure of liberal free speech principles to protect the rights
of women and minorities. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); SPEECH AND HARM:
CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE SPEECH (Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan eds.,
2012); Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan, On Racist Hate Speech and the Scope of
a Free Speech Principle, 23 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 343 (2010).
165. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
166. Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 272.
167. Id. at 274–75.
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of voters, as recognized by the interrelated nature of the rights in Burdick.168
Since voters’ rights have greater protection, as a recognized fundamental liberty interest, if a lesser protected candidacy right is violated, then the right of
the voters to cast a ballot for that candidate would also be burdened. With that
in mind, this section is broken into two parts: Part 1 addresses the court’s underappreciation of the injury imposed on Johns by the delay, and Part 2 addresses the court’s underappreciation that the voter registration requirement
applies in a nondiscriminatory way.

1. The Court Underappreciates the Injury Imposed on Johns by a Delay in
Candidacy
The court reasoned that because Johns is now registered to vote, she is
only temporarily delayed from being a candidate and that this temporary delay
is only a nominal injury.169 The court relied on two cases to support this rationale, both of which are distinguishable from the instant case.170 One involved a challenge to a minimum age requirement.171 The other case challenged a requirement for completing a term of office before assuming a second
elected role.172
A challenge to a minimum age requirement is different from a voter registration requirement because a minimum age requirement applies to nearly
every facet of public life as a safeguard against immaturity and, in some cases,
ensures that sufficient biological developments have occurred so that the reg-

168. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (noting that “[e]lection laws will
invariably impose some burden upon individual voters”).
169. Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 274–75.
170. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982); Stiles v. Blunt, 912 F.2d 260 (8th
Cir. 1990). Judge Stith’s dissent explains why these two cases are distinguishable. Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 281–82 (Stith, J., dissenting). The candidate requirement at issue
in Clements barred sitting officeholders from running for other elected positions until
the officeholder concluded his or her term in office. Clements, 457 U.S. at 960. Judge
Stith distinguished the State’s legitimate concern as not relevant to Missouri’s concern
because the State’s concern in Clements was that candidates would neglect their present-office responsibilities while engaging in campaign activities. Peters, 489 S.W.3d
at 281–82 (Stith, J., dissenting). Johns was not a current officeholder; thus, the concern
in Clements did not apply. Stiles is distinguishable because the candidate requirement
at issue was a minimum age requirement. Stiles, 912 F.2d at 261–62, 265–66; Peters,
489 S.W.3d at 282 (Stith, J., dissenting). The Stiles court reasoned that age correlates
with maturity, and thus the State’s concern that candidates have a minimum level of
maturity, by way of reaching a certain age, was sufficiently related. Stiles, 912 F.2d at
267–68.
171. Stiles, 912 F.2d at 261–62.
172. Clements, 457 U.S. at 966–67.
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ulated activity is safer for the participant – for example, driving license requirements,173 alcohol and tobacco sales,174 and contractual capacities.175 Even candidacy minimum age requirements are undergirded by these considerations,
and barring premature death, everyone will inevitably eclipse the minimum
age. Minimum age requirements are warranted because their underlying rationales are more substantial and more closely related to the State’s concern
due to the close scientific correlation between age and maturity.176 Discussed
more fully infra,177 Missouri’s proffered interests that purportedly justify a
voter registration requirement include (1) ensuring that candidates demonstrate
a minimal level of civic engagement and (2) winnowing the field of frivolous
candidacies. Each tenuously support the State’s interest in maintaining orderly
elections. Denying an eighteen-year-old, whose biological development is not
yet fully complete, access to buy alcohol, or even access to a state legislative
ballot, is distinguishable from denying a long-term resident of Missouri and
community activist access to the ballot.
In light of the State’s questionable interests, a more obvious reason that a
voter registration requirement imposes a more significant harm than the court
credits is that Johns sought to run in the 2016 election, rather than some other
election.178 Denied access to the ballot is significantly injurious because the
social and political factors at play during any election are unique and factor
into a candidate’s decision to enter a race.179 The issues that press upon the
minds of the voters when considering candidates in the ballot box vary from
election to election. The political machinery, which increasingly determines
election outcomes, coalesces behind candidates based on these issues. In short,
timing in elections is everything. Johns registered to vote in the wake of social
173. MO. REV. STAT. § 302.178 (2016).
174. MO. REV. STAT. § 311.325 (Cum. Supp. 2017) (alcohol sales); MO. REV. STAT.

§ 407.933 (2016) (tobacco sales).
175. MO. REV. STAT. § 431.055 (2016).
176. See Sara B. Johnson et al., Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise
and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH 216, 219 (2009) (discussing the important relationship between the development of the prefrontal cortex and judgment and decision making).
177. See discussion infra Part V.B.
178. Political scientists have long recognized the importance of timing in elections.
See Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Timing of Elections, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 37, 43 (2010) (“The ability to exclude parties or candidates from ballots, to regulate who may vote, and to determine the way in which those votes are tallied are standard tools for influencing the outcomes of democratic elections.”); see also Walter J.
Stone & L. Sandy Maisel, The Not-So-Simple Calculus of Winning: Potential U.S.
House Candidates’ Nomination and General Election Prospects, 65 J. POL. 951 (2003)
(discussing generally the careful consideration of candidate entry into election races).
179. See Gordon S. Black, A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the
Role of Structural Incentives, 66 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 144, 144–45 (1972); see also
JOSEPH A. SCHLESINGER, AMBITION AND POLITICS: POLITICAL CAREERS IN THE UNITED
STATES 6, 9 (1966) (discussing ambition theory in the context of politicians seeking
office).
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protests in her community.180 The issues for which she advocated were unique
to a political movement, of which the supporting tide may shift with future
elections. Ironically, Johns answered the call to civic engagement only to be
told that she was not qualified because she was not sufficiently civically engaged.181

2. The Court Underappreciates the Discriminatory Nature of the Voter
Registration Requirement
The court underappreciates the disparate impact of a voter registration
requirement on the class of those denied the right of suffrage because they were
“adjudged incapacitated, incarcerated, on probation or parole after commission
of a felony, or convicted of a crime.”182
The devastating effect of mass incarceration on communities of color is
undeniable.183 Black neighborhoods in St. Louis have been especially affected
by a regime of discriminatory policing practices and an application of a statutory scheme that disproportionately penalized black residents over white residents.184 Johns sought to address these very issues by running for office.185
While Johns herself was not subject to disenfranchisement because of laws that
strip those convicted of felonies of their right to vote, some who might have
supported her are barred from voting because of their felony convictions.
These statutes are vestiges of a legal regime intended to prevent individuals of
color from voting as well as to dilute support for candidates running to address
issues affecting communities of color.186 This disenfranchised class is also
barred from running for office. While the court was certainly aware of the
effect of voter registration requirements on potential candidates, and perhaps

180. Appellant’s Brief at 1–2, Peters v. Johns, 489 S.W.3d 262 (Mo. 2016) (en
banc) (No. SC 95678).
181. Similarly, the court arrived at a de minimis burden analysis for the voters’
rights at issue. The court reasoned along the same lines that the burden on the voters
is only temporary in that voters are not denied the right to vote for Johns in future
election. Instead, voters are merely denied the right to vote for Johns in 2016; therefore,
only a de minimis burden existed. Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 277.
182. Id. at 274 n.15.
183. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004) (discussing
the impact of mass imprisonment on community networks, social norms, citizenship
and franchise, labor market exclusion, and enforced civic isolation).
184. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 2, at 42.
185. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 180, at 1–2.
186. Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace of Negro Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850–2002,
109 AM. J. SOC. 559, 563 (2003) (“Felon voting restrictions were the first widespread
set of legal disenfranchisement measures that would be imposed on African-Americans, although violence and intimidation against prospective African-American voters
were also common . . . .”).
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there is wisdom in not permitting those convicted of felonies to enter the policy-making arena, the court cannot fairly say that voter registration requirements are nondiscriminatory in application considering commonly known sociological facts.187

B. The Court Over-Appreciates the State’s Interests and the Restriction Is Not Necessary
The voter registration requirement under article III, section 4 reveals itself
as a substantial burden when considering Missouri’s interest supporting the
provision and the (lack of) necessity of the requirement. The court discussed
two interests that Missouri had in a voter registration requirement: (1) to protect
the electoral integrity from “frivolous candidacies” and (2) to require that candidates demonstrate a minimal level of civic engagement and commitment to
Missouri’s electoral process.188
As the court recognized, the State’s interest in preventing frivolous candidacies and voter confusion need not be supported by a “particularized showing” of actual “voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidacies” prior to the imposition of a “reasonable restriction[] on ballot
access.”189 Important to the court’s argument is its qualification of restrictions
on ballot access as “reasonable.”
A restriction on ballot access must be “justified by a legitimate interest”
and the restriction must be a “reasonable way of accomplishing this goal.”190
For Missouri’s voter registration requirement to be reasonable, it must accomplish the State’s goal of protecting electoral integrity from “frivolous candidacies.” As a policy, Missouri should cautiously review restrictions that aim to
decide what makes a candidate “frivolous” because the “impact of candidate
eligibility requirements on voters implicates basic constitutional rights.”191 A
determination of “frivolity” seems difficult, if not impossible, for the State to
achieve because it is entirely subjective, beholden to the individual or group of
individuals making the determination. Many may have considered our sitting
187. One out of every thirteen African Americans of voting age cannot vote because
of felony conviction disenfranchisement statutes. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., STATELEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010 at 1–
2 (July 2012), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/StateLevel-Estimates-of-Felon-Disenfranchisement-in-the-United-States-2010.pdf.
This
rate is four times greater than non-African Americans, where nearly 7.7% of the adult
African American population is disenfranchised compared to 1.8% of the non-African
American populations. Id.; see also JEAN CHUNG, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A
PRIMER
(Jan.
2017),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Felony-Disenfranchisement-Primer.pdf (presenting same).
188. Peters v. Johns, 489 S.W.3d 262, 275 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
189. Id. at 275 (citing Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194–95
(1986)).
190. Id. at 273 (citing Schulz v. Williams, 44 F.3d 48, 57 (2d Cir. 1994)).
191. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786, 788 n.9 (1983).
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President a frivolous candidate at the outset of his campaign. It seems unreasonable that whether a person be registered (or not) to vote for any period
would be an indicator of “seriousness” or “frivolousness” but rather an indicator of whether one intends to vote – and given abysmal voter turnout rates, even
this is questionable. Additionally, as Judge Stith noted in her dissent,192 Missouri does not require a minimal period of voter registration for positions of
higher office.193 For example, Johns would have qualified to run for Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Secretary of State, and State Auditor
without registering to vote.194 Should it be assumed that the State does not care
to ensure that officeholders of these positions are civically engaged and committed to Missouri’s electoral process? Perhaps it could be argued that, practically speaking, to successfully wage a state-wide campaign for one of these
positions, a candidate surely would have already held an elected office. But
recent trends suggest that demonstrated prior civic engagement and commitment to the electoral process is neither an important consideration for voters
nor a necessary requirement for ensuring that serious candidates receive the
due attention and focus of voters.195 That durational voter registration requirements are not required indicium of “seriousness” or “frivolity” for these higher
offices strongly suggests that the restriction is unreasonable.
Nor does a voter registration requirement reasonably accomplish the
State’s interest that candidates demonstrate a minimal level of civic engagement and commitment to Missouri’s electoral process. As the dissent notes,
only one-third of registered voters even vote at all, much less demonstrate civic
engagement beyond voting in major elections.196 With such abysmal turnout
rates in elections, it can hardly be said that being a registered voter indicates
even the barest level of civic engagement. Thus, a durational voter registration
requirement seems a poor indicator of civic engagement. As Judge Stith reasoned in her dissent:

192. Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 284 (Stith, J., dissenting).
193. For example, the only qualifications to run for governor are that the candidate

be at least thirty-five years old, a citizen of the United States, and a resident of Missouri
for ten years prior to the election. MO. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
194. See id. (governor); MO. CONST. art. IV, § 10 (lieutenant governor); MO.
CONST. art. VII, § 8 (attorney general, secretary of state, and state auditor).
195. See, e.g., Zachary Crockett, Donald Trump Is the Only US President Ever with
No Political or Military Experience, VOX (Jan. 23, 2017, 10:07 AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/11/13587532/donald-trump-no-experience (“Trump’s lack of public service is part of the ‘outsider’ appeal that may have
contributed to his success: Polls have shown that most Americans, especially Trump
supporters, distrust the government.”); see also Jason Hancock, Political Newcomer
Eric Greitens Defeats Democrat Chris Koster in Missouri Governor Race, KAN. CITY
STAR (Nov. 9, 2016, 9:26 AM), http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/election/article113266403.html (discussing Governor Eric Greitens’s platform to
clean up Jefferson City politics).
196. Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 283 (Stith, J., dissenting).
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Why is registration any more relevant to guaranteeing a committed
and civic-minded representative than would be other far stronger indicators of public mindedness, such as testifying about public issues,
demonstrating for or against public issues of the day, being active in the
League of Women Voters, working for a candidate for election, or any
of a dozen other indicators of civic pride and interest? 197

In comparison, such a poor indicator cannot be called reasonable, especially when there are other, better indicators of civic engagement; perhaps none
of which are better than actually running for office and fulfilling all the substantial requirements to do so.
Under these considerations, the court appears to have over-appreciated
the State’s interest supporting article III, section 4. It also neglected to adequately consider Anderson’s tailoring requirement, which requires the court to
“consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the
[candidate’s] rights.” But under Anderson’s tailoring requirement, it is hardly
clear that the voter registration requirement of article III, section 4 is “necessary” to achieve Missouri’s interests in maintaining electoral integrity.
A narrow definition of Anderson necessity would require that the state
interest be achieved by no other means. If the State wishes to winnow the field
to only serious candidates, is winnowing not already achieved by the other requirements of article III, section 4?198 Article III, section 4’s residential requirements ensure that the candidate is part of the community that she seeks to
represent, while the provision’s minimum age requirement further winnows the
field to those who have matured to twenty-four years old, giving individuals
ample opportunity to learn a trade or complete a program of post-secondary
education.
A broader interpretation of Anderson’s tailoring requirement might be
satisfied if Missouri’s interests were achieved by the restriction, even if there
were better means of achieving the interest or if some other restriction already
accomplished the stated interest. But under this broad interpretation, the meaning of “necessary” seems to be impoverished. Necessary is defined as “absolutely needed” or “required.”199 How could a restriction that is not absolutely
needed be in any sense “necessary” when it is already achieved by other restrictions?
The State’s interest in requiring candidates to demonstrate a minimal
level of civic engagement and commitment to Missouri’s electoral process is
even less necessary than its winnowing rationale. There is no logical necessity
in the relationship between the registered voter and that voter’s civic engagement. As mentioned, scores of registered voters never make it to the polls,
197. Id.
198. See MO. CONST. art. III, § 4. Article III, section 4 also requires candidates be

at least twenty-four years old and a one-year resident of the legislative district in which
they seek election. Id.
199. Necessary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/necessary (last updated Mar. 23, 2018).
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while many volunteer in the community and advocate politically without ever
casting a ballot. With such little civic engagement in the electoral process to
begin with, it seems counterintuitive to discourage candidates who are recently
moved to civic engagement. Candidates animated by recent events will represent the very issues that press upon the minds of voters at the ballot box.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Anderson test requires the court to balance “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First . . . Amendment[] that the [candidate] seeks to vindicate” against the identified and evaluated “precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden
imposed by its rule.”200 The balancing test further requires the court to “not
only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests,” but also
it must “consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the [candidate’s] rights.”201 In this analysis of Johns’s rights, the court
underappreciated the character and magnitude of the injury imposed by article
III, section 4. It also over-appreciated the validity of the State’s interests and
the necessary extent by which the regulation accomplished those interests.
These misappraisals resulted in a de minimis burden determination, resulting
in an application of rational basis review. If the court applied Anderson more
rigorously, then it may have deemed the burden imposed by the requirement
substantial, thereby warranting an application of strict scrutiny. Application of
strict scrutiny would have likely invalidated the voter registration requirement
under article III, section 4. Johns would have then likely remained on the November ballot, where she may or may not have won the election. Her opponent
was the incumbent, and she faced an uphill political battle. Regardless, voters
did not have the chance to cast their ballots for her because of the court’s misguided ruling.

200. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
201. Id.
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